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State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional
Corporations: an Historical Perspective
A state may constitutionally tax only that amount of a multiju-
risdictional corporation's income which bears a rational relation-
ship to the taxing state.1 This prevents the jurisdiction from taxing
more income than what can reasonably be considered as earned
within its borders. Usually, the state will apportion part of a corpo-
ration's income based on the values of property, payroll and sales
of the corporation within the state.2 The instate values of property,
payroll and sales for a business are compared with property, pay-
roll and sales located everywhere. The resultant fraction is multi-
plied against the total income subject to apportionment (i.e. in-
come derived only from that business), to arrive at the amount of
income taxable by the state.3 The apportionable income however,
must be derived only from a business with which the taxing state
has a sufficient nexus.4 A problem frequently occurs in trying to
ascertain the scope of this business, as not all income earned by a
company will always be connected with the business carried on in
the taxing state. Complexities arise when a corporation operates
diverse businesses through a multitude of divisions, subsidiaries
and other associated companies in a number of jurisdictions and
perhaps even countries. The related business activities over which
1. The due process clause imposes two restrictions upon a state's power to tax income
generated by instate activities of an interstate business. First, there must be "some minimal
connection between those activities and the taxing State." Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340-45 (1954)). Second,
"the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to 'values
connected with the taxing State.'" 437 U.S. at 273. See also infra note 146 and accompany-
ing text.
2. See G.A.O. REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MFANS: Key
Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving,
(1982) [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. REPORT]. The alternative to apportioning income in this
manner is to use separate accounting. Separate accounting requires a company to isolate
income-producing activities and income sources in one state from all others, in determining
income attributable to that state. Regardless, most states use some sort of formulary appor-
tionment to ascertain taxable income. See, e.g., infra notes 10 and 197 and accompanying
text.
3. See infra note 161.
4. See supra note 1.
5. To further compound this problem, each of the 45 states that levy an income tax
against multijurisdictional corporations apply formulary apportionment in somewhat of a
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the taxing state has jurisdiction for tax purposes is often called the
"unitary business.""
Three major subjects of controversy are prevalent in this area.
Much litigation has ensued over the years in attempts to define
what actually constitutes a unitary business. The propriety of the
particular, formula used to apportion income has also been ques-
tioned quite regularly. If this is not enough, aggressive state legis-
latures and revenue departments have now expanded the concept
of "unitary business" to comprehend worldwide operations of a
corporation.7
Therefore, in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue De-
partment8 and ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission9 the
United States Supreme Court attempted to further clarify the defi-
nition of a unitary business. Last term in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board,10 the Court sustained the consti-
tutionality of the states' taxing of a "worldwide unitary business."
different manner. It was the "bewildering variety of rules" that prompted the study by the
Comptroller General that resulted in the G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at Digest.
6. To constitute a unitary business there must be some "sharing or exchange of value
not capable of precise identification or measurement-beyond the mere flow of funds arising
out of a passive or a distinct business operation-which renders formula apportionment a
reasonable method of taxation." Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct.
2933, 2940 (1983). See infra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 178-216 and accom-
panying text.
7. Originally, the scope of a unitary business was confined primarily to domestic busi-
ness activity.
8. 458 U.S. 354 (1982). See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
9. 458 U.S. 307 (1982). See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
10. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983). Container was the first case considered by the United
States Supreme Court that specifically challenged the constitutional validity of worldwide
unitary taxation. The Court did, however, narrowly limit its holding to taxation of a domes-
tic parent company and foreign subsidiary, leaving unanswered the constitutionality of taxa-
tion of a foreign parent and domestic subsidiary. Id. at 2956 n.32. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, stated:
The unitary business/formula apportionment method is a very different approach to
the problem of taxing businesses operating in more than one jurisdiction. It rejects
geographical or transactional accounting, and instead calculates the local tax base by
first defining the scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxed enterprise's ac-
tivities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportioning the total in-
come of that "unitary business" between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the
world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corpora-
tion's activities within and without the jurisdiction.
Id. at 2940.
Forty-four states (and the District of Columbia) presently levy some sort of income tax on
multijurisdictional corporations. Of these, 13 states apply worldwide combined reporting to
corporations operating within and outside the United States, in determining taxable income
subject to apportionment. However, 27 other states restrict application of combined report-
ing to a domestic basis only. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at Appendix II.
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This comment will discuss the evolution of state income taxation
of a unitary business beginning with the early property tax cases,
and subsequently review how this concept has been refined over
the years. Next, the formulary apportionment of unitary business
income will be analyzed with particular emphasis placed on the
sometimes distortive results. Finally, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Container will be evaluated with a view towards the
future implications for state income tax practitioners.
I. EVOLUTION OF UNITARY TAXATION
Unitary taxation first emerged in the ad valorem property tax
cases respecting the multi-state operations of railroads.11 A state
was initially permitted to assess for tax purposes a portion of the
value of the railroad's total property, in the proportion that the
railroad's track in the taxing jurisdiction bore to its track as a
whole, regardless of where such track or property was located."
The essential theory behind unitary taxation was succinctly stated
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Wallace v. Hines" as follows:
The only reason for allowing a State to look beyond its borders when it
taxes the property of foreign corporations is that it may get the true value
of the things within it, when they are part of an organic system of wide
extent, that gives them a value above what they otherwise would possess."
11. See, e.g., State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115
U.S. 321 (1885).
12. One commentator has noted:
The property cases do establish the unit rule or unitary concept for state tax pur-
poses. These cases permit a state to determine the in-state privilege, property or in-
come by reference to the total privileges, properties or income of the multistate busi-
ness, regardless of whether the business is conducted in a single or multiple corporate
form, if there is a unitary relationship between the in-state activities or properties.
They also establish the proposition that all of the properties of a unitary business
utilized in carrying on the unitary business are subject to a reasonable rule of appor-
tionment. These cases also support the principle that an apportionment formula is
presumed to be reasonable and the burden is on the taxpayer to establish otherwise.
See Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate - Multinational
Businesses, 10 URw. LAw. 243 (1978).
13. 253 U.S. 66 (1920). The taxpayer railroad here had protested apportionment of
property value based on track located within North Dakota, asserting that the large and
valuable terminals located outside the state did not contribute to the value of property lo-
cated within the state.- The United States Supreme Court sustained the taxpayer's conten-
tions. Id. at 70.
14. Id. at 69. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939), which es-
sentially reiterated this principle in a state income tax context. Id. at 336.
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A. Development of the Unitary Concept for State Income
Taxation
One of the earlier cases extending the unitary concept from
property cases to state income taxation is Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain.'5 The State of Connecticut had applied its two
percent tax rate against Underwood's income for federal tax pur-
poses, having attributed as income to Connecticut the same per-
centage as the taxpayer's real and tangible property located in that
state bore to its real and tangible personal property located every-
where." This apportionment resulted in Connecticut taxing
$629,668.50 (47%) of the company's net income, instead of the
mere $42,942.18 (3%) that Underwood claimed had been earned in
Connecticut. 1
7
Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, indicated that the
company had not attempted to show that forty-seven percent of its
income was not actually earned in Connecticut, and therefore it
was conceivable that a higher percentage may have been more ap-
propriate.' 8 Thus, the unitary concept application to state income
taxation was affirmed. However, the clear implication by the Court
was that if the taxpayer could have established that the method of
apportionment used by the state was "inherently arbitrary" or that
it produced an "unreasonable result," the decision might have
been different.'
Several years later, the Court again upheld formulary apportion-
ment of income for a vertically integrated business in Bass, Rat-
cliff v. State.2 0 Although in that case the taxpayer's business tran-
15. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). Underwood Typewriter Co. was headquartered in New York
City, but manufactured typewriters and other items in Connecticut. It sold, repaired and
leased its products in many states (in addition to Connecticut), through branch offices. Id.
at 118-19.
16. Id. This is commonly referred to as a "single-factor" formula. The taxpayer chal-
lenged the application of the tax on the grounds that it burdened interstate commerce and
violated due process by taxing income earned outside of the state. Id. at 120.
17. Id. at 119-20.
18. Id. at 121. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that "[t]he profits of the corporation were
largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut, and
ending with sale in other states." Id. at 120.
19. Id. at 121.
20. 266 U.S. 271 (1924). Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. was a British corporation brew-
ing ale in England, and importing part of its brew into the United States for sale therein
(the company was considered to be vertically integrated because it brewed the ale itself,
instead of purchasing it from somebody else for resale). The company had a branch office
located in New York and another in Chicago, through which the sales were made. It asserted
that its total net income of $2,185,600 was derived from outside of New York. In fact, Bass,
Ratcliff reported no income on its federal tax return for the year in question. Id. at 278-79.
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scended national boundaries, Underwood was deemed to be
controlling.2 The tax at issue was considered to be levied for the
privilege of doing business in the State of New York, and was only
measured by the income allocated for tax purposes which derived
from the business conducted during the preceding year.22
Nevertheless, Underwood and Bass, Ratcliff did not portend a
mechanical approval of all methods of formulary apportionment. 23
This fact was soon established in Hans Rees' Sons v. North Caro-
lina,4 in which the Court held unconstitutional the application of
a single-factor formula, similar to the formulas previously sus-
tained in Underwood and Bass, Ratcliff. The taxpayer asserted
that the treatment of its business as unitary for purposes of allo-
cating income grossly distorted the amount of income that was ac-
tually attributable to North Carolina, and that application of the
formula to its specific factual situation was arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. 2  The United States Supreme Court agreed, indicating
that Hans Rees' Sons had made the necessary showing of distor-
tion that was required to invalidate the tax. 8
21. Id. at 280.
22. Id.
23. One wonders now if this is still the case, particularly after Container. See infra
notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
24. 283 U.S. 123 (1930). Hans Rees' Sons had a manufacturing plant located in North
Carolina at which the manufacture of heavy leathers occurred. It also purchased leather in
the open market for resale through a New York warehouse and New York offices. The com-
pany offered evidence that established that its income was derived from three sources: (1)
buying profit; (2) manufacturing profit; and (3) selling profit. During the four year period in
question (1923-1926), Hans Rees' Sons demonstrated that the portion of income attributa-
ble to operations in North Carolina averaged 17%. In contrast, the state by using its formu-
lary apportionment, had concluded that an average of 80% of the taxpayer's total income in
each of these years should be subject to the North Carolina tax. Id. at 125-34.
25. Id. at 125-26. On this basis, it was asserted that the tax was violative of the com-
merce clause and also section 1 of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution
(due process and equal protection). U.S. CoNsT. amend. 14.
26. 283 U.S. at 134-36. Hans Rees' Sons has been cited as recently as Container for
the principle that if the taxpayer meets its burden of proof and proves gross distortion, the
tax will be struck down. 103 S. Ct. at 2942. See also infra notes 195-199 and accompanying
text. Notwithstanding this, the Court's actions in recent years have prompted one promi-
nent scholar on state and local taxation to comment: "Hans Rees stands alone as an isolated
monument to the ability of one taxpayer to use separate accounting evidence to challenge
successfully a state's apportionment of unitary business income." See Hellerstein, State In-
come Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H. R.
5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1980). See also infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text, and
Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co. v. Maxwell, 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397, afl'd, 291 U.S. 642 (1933)(per
curiam). In Kent-Coffey, the taxpayer tried to include intangible property (capital stock
with a situs of Delaware where the corporation was headquartered) into the denominator of
the property factor used to apportion net income. The United States Supreme Court, in
upholding the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment against the taxpayer, merely
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The Court has subsequently ruled in favor of the taxpayer when
attempts were made to tax transactions which bore no relationship
to the taxing state. For example, in Connecticut General Life In-
surance Co. v. Johnson," the insurance company which was doing
business in California, had additionally entered into reinsurance
contracts with other insurers doing business within that state.2"
These contracts were entered into in Connecticut where the premi-
ums were paid and where the losses, if any were payable.2 9 Mr.
Justice Stone, writing for the majority, indicated that taxation of
these reinsurance premiums by the State of California, was viola-
tive of due process on the basis that a state cannot tax or regulate
a corporation's property and activities located elsewhere.30
Shortly thereafter in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,31 Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter paraphrased the due process of law test in a state
taxation contest as being nothing more than "whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask return. 3 2 It was further
observed that a tax being contingent upon events occurring outside
the state will not destroy the nexus between that state and the
taxable transactions occurring therein.3
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to review the prop-
erty, payroll and sales three-factor formula34 in Butler Brothers v.
McColgan.3 5 The taxpayer in Butler Brothers had attempted to in-
validate the results of the apportionment of its income through the
use of separate accounting. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opin-
stated that Underwood and not Hans Rees' Sons was controlling. Id.
27. 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
28. Id. at 81. A reinsurance contract will indemnify an insurance carrier against losses
on policies it has written. Id.
29. Id. at 78.
30. Id. at 82.
31. 311 U.S. 435 (1940). Wisconsin imposed a tax upon domestic and foreign corpora-
tions on the privilege of declaring and paying dividends derived from income earned within
Wisconsin and payable to Wisconsin residents and non-residents alike. Id. at 440 n.1. J. C.
Penney was a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in New York
where its Board of Directors declared the dividends, among other things. Id. at 443.
32. Id. at 444. The Court distinguished Connecticut General as outlining the scope of
state taxing power, and not being applicable to the facts in the instant case. Id. at 445-46.
33. Id. at 445.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
35. 315 U.S. 501 (1942). In Butler Bros. the taxpayer was an Illinois corporation doing
business in California. It had wholesale distributing houses for the sale of dry goods and
general merchandise located in seven states, including one at San Francisco, California.
Each of the houses had a separate sales staff, credit collection department and maintained
its own books of account. However, the purchasing was performed for all houses through a
central division. Certain of the other activities were also centralized. Id. at 504-06.
36. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ion for the Court, indicated that such an accounting did not, and
hinted perhaps could not, impeach the propriety of the formulary
apportionment. 17 Though it was implied that had the taxpayer
made a showing that certain of the income was unconnected with
the unitary business, it would have been excluded from the appor-
tionable income base."e
Additionally, in determining whether or not there was a unitary
business, the Court endorsed the three-unities test earlier set forth
in thet case by the California Supreme Court.3 9 For a finding that
a business is unitary, there must be: "(1) unity of ownership; (2)
unity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising,
accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use in its
centralized executive force and general system of operation.
4 0
Thus, after Butler Brothers perhaps the only way to exclude in-
come from the apportionment of a purported unitary business
would be to demonstrate that such income was totally unconnected
with the business. The merits of a separate accounting analysis are
now particularly suspect after Container Corporation of America,
in which the Court stated: "The problem with this method is that
formal accounting is subject to manipulation and imprecision, and
often ignores or captures inadequately the many subtle and largely
unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the compo-
nents of a single enterprise.
' '1
B. Refinement of the Unitary Concept
One of the most vexing and controversial issues confronting cor-
porate taxpayers today, is what constitutes a unitary business.'2
Naturally, most states attempt to include as much of a taxpayer's
operations (and profit) as possible within the scope of its unitary
business." The existence of a unitary business provides the mini-
37. 315 U.S. at 507-08.
38. Id. at 509.
39. Id. at 508.
40. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), and 315 U.S. at 508.
This test has frequently been used over the years, but recently has been displaced by a
multi-faceted and more sophisticated analysis. See infra notes 181-192 and accompanying
text.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2940. See supra note 6, and infra notes 193-199 and accompanying
text.
42. See G.A.O. REPoRT, supra note 2, at Digest.
43. Multijurisdictional corporations are generally opposed to the use of worldwide
combined reporting for a number of reasons. Primarily, opponents of worldwide combined
reporting assert that it poses risks of international multiple taxation; that such reporting
misallocates to a state more than its proper share of income because of incomparability of
1984
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mum nexus that a state must have with the out-of-state activities
of a multijurisdictional business in order to justify the state's tax-
ing an apportioned share of the unitary business' income. This is
because once a unitary determination has been made for a multiju-
risdictional business, the state has some connection with its
entirety.
44
Although the "three-unities" test set forth in Butler Brothers"5
related to unincorporated wholly controlled branches of a business
located in different jurisdictions, the California Supreme Court
subsequently extended this test for unitary characterization to in-
corporated wholly controlled businesses so located. In Edison Cali-
fornia Stores v. McColgan 4 the court refined the three-unities test
by stating that, "[i]f the operation of the portion of the business
done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the op-
eration of the business without the state, the operations are
unitary. . . .
The authority of Butler Brothers and Edison California Stores
factors in an international environment; and that reporting requirements create an undue
administrative burden. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-38.
Certain states allocate "non-business" income to a single state, which income typically
includes such things as dividends, interest and rental income. Income is allocated to a state
based on criteria such as location of the income-producing assets or the site of the corpora-
tion's headquarters. Therefore, a determination of unitary is without consequence regarding
non-business income when such income is allocated by the taxing state. See G.A.O. REPORT,
supra note 2, at 48. There are currently 24 states which recognize the distinction between
business versus non-business income, allocating the latter. Another 10 states apportion busi-
ness income and allocate other types of income which they classify in various ways. Id. at
66.
Furthermore, not all taxpayers will contest a finding of unitary in respect of "business"
income, and may even assert unitary to the maximum extent possible. See, e.g., Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), in which Caterpillar sought
relief after concluding that it had overpaid its Illinois state income tax liability by almost
$11,000,000 between the years 1969-1974, because it had not filed tax returns on a world-
wide combined basis. Id. at 112, 417 N.E.2d at 1350. Instead, Caterpillar had originally com-
pared only the instate totals of each corporation with the instate and out of state totals for
property, payroll and sales of the same corporation and not of the unitary business group.
Id. at 110, 417 N.E.2d at 1347. In Caterpillar, the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the
validity of worldwide combined reporting as interpreted under Illinois law. See also infra
notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
44. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part
II: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REv. 157, 168 (1982).
45. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
46. 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947). Edison California Stores comprised 15 subsidi-
ary corporations located in as many states, including one in California which was the plain-
tiff in the instant case. The parent company, a Delaware corporation, performed many cen-
tralized functions for the subsidiaries, similar to what was performed for the branch offices
in Butler Bros. Id. at 474, 183 P.2d at 18. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
47. 30 Cal.2d at 481, 183 P.2d at 21. See infra note 53.
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persisted throughout the next several decades, with no further de-
finitive pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court on
what constituted a unitary operation prior to 1980.8 However, in
the interim period state courts continued to grapple with the prob-
lem. It was not unheard of for a state revenue department to
change positions on whether unitary business apportionment or a
separate accounting should determine what income was subject to
taxation. The method preferred would be dependent upon which
techn;que would yield the highest tax revenue. For example, the
State of California Franchise Tax Board asserted in both Superior
Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board 4  and Honolulu Oil Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Board5 0 that a separate accounting of what income
was reasonably attributable to California was the correct method
to use, whenever such an accounting was possible .5 Notwithstand-
ing Butler Brothers and Edison California Stores, the Board ar-
gued that in order for a determination that a business was unitary
to prevail, "it must appear that the operations within and without
the state are 'necessary and essential' to each other and to the
functioning of the business as a whole."' 2 The California Supreme
Court summarily dismissed this argument indicating that it was
without basis in law, and reaffirmed the three-unities test origi-
nally propounded in Butler Brothers"
It was not until 1980, that the United States Supreme Court
again confronted the unitary business dilemma. In Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes" and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Revenue,5 the Court resolved unitary business questions
but failed to do much to clarify existing law. The majority simply
48. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
49. 60 Cal. 2d 406, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P.2d 33 (1963). Superior Oil Co. sold crude
petroleum derived from California operations to only California customers, and sold crude
petroleum derived from outside of the state to only those customers located outside of the
state. Id.
50. 60 Cal. 2d 417, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552, 386 P.2d 40 (1963). The facts were essentially the
same as in Superior Oil. In both instances, the companies lost money in out of state opera-
tions, notwithstanding that operations within the State of California were highly profitable.
Formulary apportionment would look at the net operating results of total operations, while
separate accounting isolated the profits associated with California, but disregarded the out-
of-state losses.
51. 60 Cal. 2d at 412, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 549, 386 P.2d at 37.
52. Id.
53. Id. For other state courts subsequently endorsing the test as articulated in Edison
California Stores, see, e.g., Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Dolan, 200 Colo. 291, 615 P.2d 16 (1980);
Coca Cola Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, 533 P.2d 788 (1975).
54. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
55. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
1984 945
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reaffirmed the broad taxing powers of the states, while indicating
that any uniformity in state income taxation could be mandated
only by Congress. 6
In Mobil, the primary issue was whether or not a nondomiciliary
state (Vermont) could constitutionally tax foreign source income
received by a domestic corporation in the form of dividends from
subsidiaries and affiliates doing business abroad. 7 The taxpayer
asserted that on due process and commerce clause grounds, foreign
source dividends were by their very nature, not apportionable in-
come. 8 Justice Black, in writing for the majority, stated that "the
linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is
the unitary business principle."0 ' Therefore, in order for the divi-
dends to be excluded from taxation, a showing had to be made
"that the [dividend] income was earned in the course of activities
unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State [Ver-
montl." 60 It was noted that Mobil Oil had not even attempted to
make such a showing.6 The Court further indicated that due pro-
cess considerations might well preclude the taxability of dividends
when the activities of the dividend payor were not part of the uni-
tary business associated with the taxing state. Thus, after Mobil
there seemed to be no question that given the existence of a uni-
tary business, separate accounting would not be a permissible way
to demonstrate that certain of the taxpayer's income was not ap-
portionable to a particular state. 3 So long as there was some in-
56. 445 U.S. at 449. For an excellent in-depth analysis of Mobil and Exxon, see Heller-
stein, supra note 26.
57. 445 U.S. at 427. See also E. CHisTiNs , STATi TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE IN-
comic (1981), a research study prepared for the Financial Executive Research Foundation.
The study, which assembles and analyzes data provided by 123 firms, concludes that states
apply their taxes to a substantially larger part of foreign source income than does the fed-
eral government.
58. 445 U.S. at 436. These assertions essentially comprised three main arguments: (1)
there was no nexus between Vermont and either Mobil's management of its investments, or
the payor corporations' business activities; (2) taxation of the dividends by Vermont would
constitute multiple taxation (a burden not imposed upon corporations operating solely in-
trastate) because the domiciliary state, New York, had the power to tax 100% of the divi-
dends (even though it did not exercise this power); and (3) the foreign source of these divi-
dends precluded their taxation, at least in states other than the payee's commercial
domicile, because of risk of multiple taxation at the international level. Id.
59. Id. at 439.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 442. Justice Black stated that "[o]ne must look principally at the underlying
activity, not at the form of the investment, to determine the propriety of apportionability."
Id. at 440.
63. In Mobil, the Court noted that "separate accounting, while it purports to isolate
Vol. 22:937
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state activity giving rise to sufficient nexus for due process pur-
poses, that state could constitutionally tax any income not clearly
shown to be unconnected with the unitary business.
Several months later, the Court in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Department of Revenue," relying largely on the principles enunci-
ated in Mobil, upheld the State of Wisconsin's income tax against
due process and commerce clause challenges. Exxon, a vertically
integrated petroleum company, did business through a functional
organization comprising a department of exploration and produc-
tion, a refining department, and a marketing department. Each
function was responsible for its own operating performance, and
income was determined by way of a corporate-wide separate ac-
counting system." Because the marketing department alone oper-
ated in Wisconsin, Exxon calculated its tax liability for that state
by apportioning only marketing department income.66
Justice Marshall, in a unanimous opinion,67 concurred with the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, stating that "[w]hile Exxon may treat
its operational departments as independent profit centers, it is
nonetheless true that this case involves a highly integrated busi-
ness which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management
and controlled interaction."" This case, which appeared to re-
present a clear-cut unitary business situation, did nothing more
than provide the United States Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to reaffirm its earlier holding in Butler Brothers. Exxon did
not even purport to establish further guidelines as to how a unitary
business should actually be defined, despite the dramatic increase
in the number of states now employing this concept in the taxation
of multijurisdictional corporations.
Several years after Mobil and Exxon were decided, the Supreme
Court again confronted the unitary issue. In ASARCO, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Commissioner,6" and F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation & Revenue Department,70 an effort was finally made to
portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to in-
come resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale." Id. at 438 (citing Butler Bros.).
64. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
65. Id. at 211-13.
66. Id. at 213.
67. Id. at 217-19.
68. Id. at 224.
69. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
70. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
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explicate the outer boundaries of a unitary business.71 The Court
also reiterated its position, established in Mobil that, in order for
intangible income to be apportionable, such income must be de-
rived from a unitary business.72 For the first time, the taxpayer
proffered an extensive factual record signifying that the income at
issue was derived from other than the unitary business operating
in the state attempting to levy its income tax. The record clearly
established the relationship between the parent-payee and the sub-
sidiary-payors. In retrospect, a factor proving to be highly critical
to the Court in its favoring the taxpayer, was that the trial court
had initially made a finding of nonunitary based on this record.7 3
ASARCO involved a taxpayer, ASARCO, Inc., which was a New
Jersey corporation domiciled in New York engaged in operating a
silver mine in Idaho.74 The State of Idaho sought to include as ap-
portionable "business income, ''7 inter alia, intangible income7 6
71. For an excellent in-depth analysis of ASARCO and Woolworth, see Hellerstein,
supra note 44. See also Peters, Supreme Court Requires Unitary Relationship Before
States Can Tax Investment Income, J. TAX'N 314 (Nov. 1982).
72. 458 U.S. at 317-19.
73. Id. at 314. See Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2946, in which the Court stated "our task
must be to determine whether the state court applied the correct [legal] standards to the
case; and if it did, whether its judgment 'was within the realm of permissible judgment."'
Justice Brennan also indicated that "ASARCO and F. W. Woolworth are consistent with
this standard of review." Id. at 2946 n.15. He further stated that "[wie concluded, relying
on factual findings made by the state courts, that a unitary business finding was impermis-
sible. ... ." Id. (original emphasis).
74. 458 U.S. at 309. ASARCO mines, smelts and refines nonferrous metals in various
states. Approximately 2.5% of ASARCO's total business activities were calculated to have
taken place in Idaho during the years in question (1968-1970). Id.
75. Id. at 309. Idaho adopted its version of UDITPA, see infra notes 108-109 and ac-
companying text, in 1965 under which income from intangible property is classified as either
"business" or "nonbusiness" income. See IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(1) (Supp. 1981), which
provides in pertinent part:
"Business income" means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayers' trade or business and includes income from the acquisition,
management, or disposition of tangible and intangible property when such acquisi-
tion, management, or disposition constitute[s] integral or necessary parts of the tax-
payers' trade or business operations. Gains or losses and dividend and interest income
from stock and securities of any foreign or domestic corporation shall be presumed to
be income from intangible property, the acquisition, management, or disposition of
which constitute an integral part of taxpayers' trade or business; such presumption
may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Id. 458 U.S. at 310 n.4. Idaho apportions "business" income according to a three-factor
formula. Id. at 310-11. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
"Nonbusiness" income is defined as including all income except "business" income. 458
U.S. at 311. Idaho allocates "nonbusiness" income associated with intangibles, in its en-
tirety, to the taxpayer's state of commercial domicile in lieu of any apportionment. Id. See
also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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that ASARCO had received from five corporations in which it held
major interests. Idaho, which had not disputed any of the facts,"
argued that "corporate purpose should define unitary business. 7 8
The assertion was that income from intangible property (e.g.
shares of stock) should be considered to derive from the unitary
business, whenever such property was used for purposes that
would contribute to that business. 7  However, Justice Powell
stated "[t]his definition of unitary business would destroy the con-
cept," since it would be all-encompassing. 0 Therefore, the Court
76. 458 U.S. at 314. The intangible income included dividends and interest payments
remitted by the subsidiary corporations to ASARCO, in addition to capital gains on the sale
of stock held therein by ASARCO. Id.
77. Id. at 309 n.2. The facts connected with the ownership in these corporations by
ASARCO are highly relevant, and can be summarized as follows:
Subsidiary % owned by % of sub. output % of ASARCO output
(line of business) ASARCO purchased by ASARCO purchased by sub.
M. I. M. Holdings Ltd. 52.7 1
(mines, smelts, & refines (see note 1)
various metals in
Australia)
General Cable Corp. 34 0.1 6
(fabricates metal
products)
Revere Copper and 34 1-2 3-4
Brass, Inc. (fabricates
metal products)
ASARCO Mexicana, 49 - -
S. A. (mines and smelts
lead & copper in
Mexico)
Southern Peru Copper 51.5 35
Corp. (mines copper in (see note 2)
Peru)
Notes:
1. Although ASARCO had the potential to control M. I. M., the trial court found that this
company operates entirely independent of, and has minimal contact with ASARCO.
2. A management contract with the other shareholders precluded ASARCO from control-
ling Southern Peru, notwithstanding the majority interest owned therein. The Court
indicated that this company presented the closest question, presumably because of the
percentage of ownership and the substantial portion of Southern Peru's output that
was purchased by ASARCO.
3. All inter-company sales and purchases were made at arms-length prices.
See id. at 321-24.




struck down Idaho's attempt to tax this income on due process
grounds. It relied on Mobil and J. C. Penney for the proposition
that when the business activities of the dividend payor have noth-
ing to do with the activities of the payee in the taxing state, then
the latter has "given nothing for which it can ask return."81
Not to be overlooked in ASARCO was a most critical footnote,
which states in part: "In both of those cases [Mobil and Exxon],
that we follow today, the states prevailed because it was clear that
the corporations operated unitary businesses with a continuous
flow and interchange of products. ASARCO has proved that these
essential factors are wholly absent in this case.
' s2
Based on the facts in Mobil and Exxon, the implication of Jus-
tice Powell's footnote is that such unitary businesses were made
evident as a result of the "continuous flow and interchange of
products" between subsidiaries (or divisions) and parent compa-
nies. Thus, given this footnote it would seem doubtful that a uni-
tary relationship could exist between two companies absent a sub-
stantial and continuous flow and interchange of products. This
would be especially true if less than a majority of stock (controlling
interest) was owned by the purported parent company in the sub-
sidiary. In four of the five subsidiary companies in ASARCO, a
substantial flow of products did not exist, nor did the parent have
controlling interest in any instance.8 3 Consequently, the Court
summarily dismissed the charges of a unitary relationship in all
four cases.84 However, with respect to the other subsidiary, South-
ern Peru, where both majority interest and substantial interchange
of products coexisted, the Justices seemed to apply a much higher
level of scrutiny in ascertaining the nature of the company's rela-
tionship with ASARCO. It was noted that not only did a manage-
ment contract preclude ASARCO from exploiting its majority in-
terest, but also that the output contract was at arm's length and
termination thereof held no operational implications for either
party.85 Based on these facts it was concluded that Southern Peru
81. Id. at 327. The Court indicated that the same standard applied to the interest and
capital gains, as well as dividends. Id. at 329-30. Quoting Mobil, it reiterated that "[o]ne
must look principally at the underlying activity, not at the form of investment, to determine
the propriety of apportionability." Id. Justice Powell further stated that just adding to the
"riches" of the parent was not enough to bring the five subsidiaries within the scope of
ASARCO's unitary business. Id.
82. Id. at 329 n.24 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 321 nn.16-21.
.84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85. 458 U.S. at 321-22, 321 n.17.
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was not unitary with ASARCO. 8e In summary, although a continu-
ous flow and interchange of products apparently may result in a
prima facie case of unitary characterization, such a condition is not
unitary per se and may be controverted by the taxpayer producing
persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Despite Justice Powell's well-reasoned opinion in ASARCO, Jus-
tice O'Connor dissented.8 7 She submitted that the subsidiary com-
panies were unitary with ASARCO based on three major factors:
(1) that the subsidiaries were engaged in the same general line of
business as the parent (consequently, the related investment deci-
sions by ASARCO turned heavily upon knowledge of its own busi-
ness);88 (2) that there was a failing by ASARCO to show that such
investments were other than merely an efficient use of idle funds
which had been accumulated for future operations in its own pri-
mary business;89 and finally (3) that since ASARCO purportedly
had effective operational control of at least three of the subsidiar-
ies, it also had the power to use them for operational advantage in
ASARCO's own metals business, regardless of whether or not it
had yet done so.90 Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that
"the Court unwisely substitutes for the multifaceted analysis used
to determine whether the businesses in Mobil Oil and Exxon were
unitary the oversimplified test of active operational control."'91 Ad-
ditionally, the dissent pointed out that the majority only com-
pounded its error by relying on the due process clause as authority,
since a holding predicated upon the commerce clause would have
been more susceptible to congressional action.2
The principles enunciated in ASARCO were further developed
in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department," the
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id. at 331 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist. Id.
88. Id. at 335-37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor indicated that "this
alone warrants affirming the Idaho Supreme Court's due process ruling." Id. at 337.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 337-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 340-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 349-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A fear was expressed that the decision in
the instant case might be beyond Congress' power to correct, because of the supposed due
process ramifications. Id. Due process violations, which essentially comprise extraterritorial
taxation, can alternatively be held as violative of the commerce clause in most situations, as
intrastate businesses not subject to such taxation will in all probability experience a lower
effective tax rate than the business operating interstate. Id. at 350 n.4 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
93. 458 U.S. 354 (1982). See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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companion case to ASARCO.94 Justice Powell, author of the major-
ity opinion in ASARCO, also wrote the opinion for the Court in
Woolworth." The primary issue was whether or not due process
considerations precluded New Mexico from taxing a portion of div-
idends remitted to F. W. Woolworth by its foreign subsidiaries,
when the latter did absolutely no business in New Mexico." The
focus again was essentially on the relationship between the subsidi-
ary-payors and the parent-payee, F. W. Woolworth. Of the four
foreign subsidiaries at issue, three were wholly owned by
Woolworth, while only 52.7% of the stock was owned in the
fourth.
97
Justice Powell started the opinion in Woolworth by referring to
ASARCO for the proposition that the mere potential for the par-
ent to exercise control over the subsidiary was not dispositive in
determining whether the companies were unitary.98 It was pointed
out that the New Mexico Supreme Court had used an incorrect
legal standard in its unitary finding-which had largely been based
on only the potential advantages accruing to the parent through
ownership of the subsidiaries, in disregard of what the actual ad-
vantages were.9 Justice Powell submitted that the proper inquiry
entailed that of looking at the "underlying unity" of the busi-
nesses, i.e., the actual relationship between the parent and subsidi-
94. 458 U.S. at 362.
95. Id. at 356. Justice O'Connor dissented for the same reasons expressed in her
ASARCO dissent. Id. at 373 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She was again joined in her dissent
by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id.
96. 458 U.S. at 356.
97. Id. at 356-57. The three wholly-owned subsidiaries were: F. W. Woolworth Gmbh,
in Germany; F. W. Woolworth, Ltd., in Canada; and F. W. Woolworth, S. A. de C. V. Mex-
ico. The fourth, in which Woolworth only owned 52.7%, was F. W. Woolworth Co., Ltd., in
England. The four subsidiary corporations engaged in chain store retailing, as F. W.
Woolworth also did. Id. In the fiscal year ending January 31, 1977, Woolworth's New Mexico
sales represented 0.5%, or approximately $13,000,000 of the company's approximately $2.5
billion total domestic sales. Id. New Mexico's statutes defining business versus nonbusiness
income, including the three-factor formula used in apportioning business income, were prac-
tically the same as those adopted by Idaho which were cited in ASARCO. Id. at 357-58 nn.2-
5 See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
98. 458 U.S. at 362.
99. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate court. The latter
had disagreed with the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, and had excluded
the dividends from apportionable business income. Id. at 360. Another facet of the New
Mexico Supreme Court's holding was that the mere possession of ownership in the subsidi-
aries enhanced the parent company's business standing, creditworthiness, etc., sufficiently to
bring the subsidiaries within the scope of the unitary business. Id. at 363. This logic was
quickly rejected by the Court, on the basis that some economic benefit will always derive
from the ownership of stock in another corporation. Id. at 363-64.
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ary, not merely the potential relationship.'00
In its analysis, the Court found that there was little functional
integration between the parent company and its subsidiaries.' 0 ' It
also noted an absence of the requisite centralized management and
economies of scale deemed indicative of a unitary business, not-
withstanding certain of the managerial links Woolworth main-
tained with the subsidiary companies.10 2 Apparently some commu-
nication between the parent and subsidiaries is permissible. As the
Court explained in its finding of nonunitary, "[e]xcept for the type
of occasional oversight-with respect to capital structure, major
debt, and dividends-that any parent gives to an investment in, a
subsidiary, there is little or no integration ... " between the par-
ent and the subsidiary. 03
ASARCO and Woolworth indicate that mere ownership is not
per se unitary, even when coupled with a substantial interchange
of goods between companies. Furthermore, the Court apparently
views the unitary issue as largely one of fact, and appears reluctant
to reverse a lower court so long as correct legal standards have
been applied. In both ASARCO and Woolworth, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the state supreme courts, and affirmed
the lower courts' original decisions of nonunitary, each of which
had previously been reversed by respective state supreme courts.'"x
The essence of a unitary relationship between parent and sub-
sidiary companies seems to be "active, operational control" result-
ing from functional integration, centralized management and econ-
omies of scale arising from the intercompany relationship. But, it
is obvious that there are no clearcut answers as to how "unitary" is
defined, except that the totality of the circumstances is critical in
100. Id. at 363-64 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 440).
101. Id. The Court noted that there was a "critical distinction" between a retail mer-
chandising business as compared to one in which manufactured products are produced in
one or more countries, and subsequently marketed worldwide (e.g. Mobil and Exxon). It was
inferred that the economies of scale, mutual interdependence, etc. that typically exist in the
latter are much less apt to prevail in a retail merchandising business. Id. One can conclude
therefore that the taxpayer will usually find it more difficult to meet the burden of proof
when manufacturing operations are involved. See also infra note 183 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, Justice Powell observed that there was no record of interchange of prod-
ucts between companies. Id. at 365 n.13.
102. Id. at 366-67. Managerial links included the fact that several of the subsidiaries'
board members also sat on the board of directors for the taxpayer and vice versa. Id. at 368
n.18. There was also occasional contact between top managements of the companies, and
regular communication by mail, telephone, etc. Id. at 368.
103. Id. at 369. Woolworth had to approve major financial decisions, such as the
amount of dividends to be declared and the creation of substantial new debt. Id. at 368-69.
104. For ASARCO, see 458 U.S. at 314-15. For Woolworth, see 458 U.S. at 360.
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ascertaining whether the requisite active operational control exists
with the resultant unitary benefits flowing therefrom.'
II. FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT
Currently, all forty-five states which have adopted a corporate
income tax apportion income to some extent.'0 6 However, no two
states apply formulary apportionment in exactly the same manner.
While generally, most states employ the standard three-factor
formula, some states use only one or two factors. Additionally,
there is significant variation from state to state as to what com-
prises a particular factor, as well as which income is apportionable.
A recent report by the Comptroller General indicates that the two
reasons for state income overtaxation most frequently cited during
its survey were: (1) income considered 100% taxable to one state
was considered apportionable by another state; and (2) income was
subject to apportionment by factors not uniform from one state to
the next.1
07
Thus, it is not surprising that in 1957, the Uniform Division of
Income for State Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) was conceived.108
UDITPA was drafted by the National Conference of Commission-
ers in response to mounting concern over the nonuniformity of
state income taxation. °9 In order for the provisions of UDITPA to
105. The Court's opinion in ASARCO can be read as implying that these benefits must
include those other than which would accrue to any ordinary investor making a similar kind
of investment.
106. See generally G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2.
107. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
108. UDITPA provides that nonbusiness income be allocated to a single taxing juris-
diction, and that only business income be apportioned among the states based on an equally
weighted three-factor formula, comprising property, payroll, and sales. Business income is
defined as that arising from transactions and activities in the regular course of the tax-
payer's trade or business. Nonbusiness income is considered to be all other income, includ-
ing income from rents, royalties, interest, dividends, capital gains, etc. See supra note 75
and accompanying text. See also State Tax News - New Uniform Act for Dividing Income
Between States Approved, 35 TAXES at 631 (August, 1957).
For an interesting overview of UDITPA in its original version, see Pierce, The Uniform
Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXEs at 747 (October, 1957). The author,
William J. Pierce, was one of the draftsmen of this particular proposal. Id. Two critical
assumptions upon which UDITPA is based are: (1) The state has jurisdiction to levy the
particular tax; and (2) Existing state law has already defined the base of the tax and the
only problem remaining is what proportion of that base should be assigned to the taxing
jurisdiction. Id.
109. The states' initial response to UDITPA was less than enthusiastic. See, e.g., Kin-
near, The Multistate Tax Commission, 19 CANADIAN TAX J. 136, 141 (1971). However, two
major events occurred within the next several years to change that. First, legislation was
passed by Congress that precluded a state from exercising jurisdiction over a corporate tax-
954
Corporations: State Income Taxation
become law, they must be enacted by the legislature of a particular
state. Unfortunately, the states have not fully embraced the provi-
sions of UDITPA. At present, only twenty-five states have adopted
most or all of UDITPA's provisions, while the remaining twenty
states with a state income tax have adopted few or none. Neverthe-
less, some believe that even if all of the states were to adopt.
UDITPA in its entirety, substantial nonuniformity would continue
to prevail. One commentator suggests that certain concepts would
inevitably be carried over from the administration of states' prior
apportionment statutes. 110 For instance, separate accounting prin-
ciples used to allocate income are not specifically dealt with under
UDITPA and would therefore remain as is under pre-existing law.
Section 18 of UDITPA1" provides for relief in the event that the
results of the formula do not "fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayer's activity in this state . . ." However, difficulties associ-
ated with the administration of this provision in conjunction with
overly aggressive state agencies will probably keep relief to a
minimum.1
2
payer, if the latter's only activity within that state was solicitation of sales orders with the
orders being accepted and filled in a different state. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1959). Second
and more importantly, the Willis Subcommittee report on taxation of interstate business
was issued in 1964. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d seas. (1964) which states in
pertinent part:
It is..'. a system which works badly for both business and the States. It is... a
system in which the States are reaching farther and farther to impose smaller and
smaller liabilities on more and more companies. It is. . . a system which calls upon
tax administrators to enforce the unenforceable, and the taxpayer to comply with the
uncompliable .... The future [does not] hold out any prospect of improvement. The
number of income tax jurisdictions increases. Laws seem to become more complex
rather than less. Improved enforcement procedures may add taxpayers to the rolls,
but still it is inconceivable that they can make any substantial impact on
noncompliance.
Id. at 598-99. See also G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 2, at 21, wherein after the above para-
graph of the Willis Report was quoted, the conclusion by the Comptroller General was:
"Unless action is taken, the current system of multijurisdictional corporate income taxation
will continue to produce inefficiency and uncertainty, burdening both State tax administra-
tors and increasing numbers of taxpayers." Id.
Furthermore, as a result of the above, not only did the states begin to embrace UDITPA,
but they also adopted the Multistate Tax Compact to help promote greater uniformity of
tax law administration, and thereby head off additional federal legislation. See Madere and
Smith, State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises: Overview for 1982, THE TAx Ex-
ECUnVE 115, 123 (January, 1982). The UDITPA has been adopted as Article IV of the Mul-
tistate Tax Compact. See also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434
U.S. 452 (1978), wherein the validity of the Multistate Tax Compact was sustained.
110. Boren, Separate Accounting in California and Uniformity in Apportioning Cor-
porate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 478, 480-81 (1971).
111. See infra note 160.
112. Boren, supra note 110, at 481.
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Over the years, deliverance from formulary apportionment has
been more illusory than real to many taxpayers. This comment will
proceed to review some of the inequities and distortive effects in-
herent in formulary apportionment, as demonstrated by a sample
of issues previously adjudicated.
A. Proving Distortion
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina'" 3 was first to establish the
proposition that for tax purposes, a state cannot attribute income
as being taxable to the taxpayer, which is "out of all appropriate
proportion" to the business transacted in that state."1 4 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of due pro-
cess and equal protection, the results of a single-factor property
formula.1 15
Yet shortly thereafter in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
North Carolina,"' the Court upheld application of a North Caro-
lina statute that set forth a formula by which the amount of in-
come subject to state tax would be determined for interstate rail-
ways doing business in North Carolina. The ratio of instate track
mileage compared to total system mileage, was applied first to
gross operating revenues and then to operating expenses, with the
resultant difference being taxable net income.117 The taxpayer
proffered evidence that actual North Carolina expenses were far in
excess of those derived under the statutory formula, but failed to
either substantiate or impeach the validity of the apportioned
gross revenues. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, indi-
cated that such a partial and fragmentary showing of facts was not
sufficient. 18 He further stated that "the burden is on the taxpayer
to make oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence."11' 9
Even today, the standard by which distortion must be proven to
sustain a taxpayer's assertion that a state is trying to tax extrater-
ritorial values is that conceived in Hans Rees' Sons and Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. Consequently, the burden still remains on
113. 283 U.S. 123 (1930). See also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
114. 283 U.S. at 135.
115. Id. at 136.
116. 297 U.S. 682 (1935).
117. Id. at 684. Justice Cardozo stated that the "[tiaxpayer and state would be
swamped with administrative difficulties if left without the aid of a formula of ready appli-
cation." Id. at 685.
118. Id. at 688.
119. Id. Witnesses for the state had testified that gross revenues were underestimated
to a much greater extent than were operating costs. Id. at 686.
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the taxpayer to show "by clear and cogent evidence" that the in-
come the state is endeavoring to tax is "out of all appropriate pro-
portion" to the business transacted therein. Despite these cases
having dealt with single-factor formulas, the same criteria have
been applied by the courts in evaluating three-factor formulas.12 0
It is enigmatic how such "clear and cogent evidence" could ever be
presented under many factual situations today, based on what is
now acknowledged to be the highly suspect nature of separate
accounting. 121
B. Apportionment Formulas Attacked
The Tax Commissioner's wide discretion and authority in
originating and prescribing an apportionment formula was sus-
tained early on by a California appellate court in Pacific Fruit Ex-
press Co. v. McColgan 2 s Pacific Fruit Express Co. was primarily
in the business of renting refrigerator cars to railroads operating
interstate, and also repaired and reconditioned these cars as neces-
sary to keep them in suitable condition. '2  The taxpayer appor-
tioned nine percent of its net income to California for the years at
issue, as determined by the miles the refrigerator cars were hauled
in California, compared to total miles hauled everywhere.124 The
Commissioner recomputed income, allocating instead about
twenty-six percent to California, on the basis of a statutory three-
factor formula comprising property, payroll and mileage associated
with that state. 2 5 It was contended that the statutory formula did
120. See, e.g., Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2939-40, and 2942. Subsequent to Hans Rees'
Sons, the standard of review has not only been further clarified, but perhaps also loosened.
See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947) wherein the Court held
that the State of Ohio could assess a privilege tax against a business by considering both
interstate and out-of-state transactions, in ascertaining the value of the interstate privilege.
Id. at 423. Additionally, the majority stated that "this Court has long realized the practical
impossibility of a state's achieving a perfect apportionment of expansive, complex business
activities such as those of appellant, and has declared that 'rough approximation rather
than precision' is sufficient." Id. at 422.
121. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See also generally G. HARLEY, INTEr-
NATIONAL DIvISION OF THE INCOME TAX BASE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE - A 'ATISE ON
THE UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT (1980).
122. 67 Cal. App. 2d 93, 153 P.2d 607 (1944).
123. Id. at 95, 153 P.2d at 608.
124. Id.
125. Id. The statute provided in pertinent part as follows:
The portion of net income derived from business done within this State, shall be
determined by an allocation upon the basis of sales, purchases, expenses of manufac-
ture, pay roll, value and situs of tangible property, or by reference to these or other
factors, or by such other method of allocation as is fairly calculated to assign to the
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not prescribe a precise method of allocating net income, and that
the Commissioner lacked authority to himself originate such a
formula."" However, the court disagreed, and further indicated
that there was a presumption that the formula used by the Com-
missioner produced a fair result which could only be overcome "by
clear and cogent evidence.
' '"1 7
Not long thereafter, several other challenges to the Commis-
sioner's use of a three-factor formula (property, payroll and sales)
to apportion net income were also found to be without merit by
the California Supreme Court. The taxpayer in El Dorado Oil
Works v. McColgan"5 had used the statutory five-factor formula to
apportion income."9 It argued that since all five factors (especially
the factor comprehending purchases) 30 were applicable, there was
a violation of due process and equal protection by the Commis-
sioner recalculating income with the three-factor formula.'31 Re-
gardless, the California Supreme Court concluded that this
formula fairly assigned income, relying largely on the district court
of appeals' previous decision in Pacific Fruit."
s2
The Commissioner used the same three-factor formula to recom-
pute income in John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Board.'
The taxpayer had originally used separate accounting to compute
California income, and asserted that the formulary apportionment
"produced unreasonable results by assigning to this state [Califor-
nia] extra-territorial values in the apportionment of the unitary in-
come . . .,,'"3 John Deere argued that California operations were
State the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business done within
this State and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation.
Id.
126. 67 Cal. App. 2d at 97, 153 P.2d at 609.
127. Id. at 96, 100, 153 P.2d at 608, 610-13, citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North
Carolina, 297 U.S. 682. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
128. 34 Cal. 2d 731, 215 P.2d 4 (1950).
129. Id. at 734, 215 P.2d at 6. See also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 735-36, 215 P.2d at 6. The taxpayer was in the business of processing and
selling coconut oil and meal. Although its manufacturing facilities were located in Califor-
nia, it purchased the bulk of its raw material, copra, in the Philippine Islands through of-
fices located there which were maintained expressly for that purpose. Id. Thus, including
purchases as a factor in apportioning income to California would have the result of drasti-
cally reducing the apportionment factor, i.e., the denominator of the formula would be in-
creased by the amount of purchases, with no effect to the numerator.
131. 34 Cal. 2d at 735-36, 215 P.2d at 7-8.
132. Id. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
133. 38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951).
134. Id. at 222, 238 P.2d at 573.
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unusually more expensive than those in other states.lss However,
the California Supreme Court summarily dismissed this conten-
tion, while revealing that results from a separate accounting sys-
tem could not be used to impeach formulary apportionment.5 6
The court stated that the only requirement in apportioning income
of a unitary business is that "the formula used be not intrinsically
arbitrary or produce an unreasonable result."13 7 Apparently, this
would now be the only grounds upon which a taxpayer could suc-
cessfully attack the Commissioner's apportionment.
Notwithstanding the validity of three-factor formulas, it ap-
peared that single-factor formulas would continue to be susceptible
to assertions of distortion and therefore, to protestations on consti-
tutional grounds. However, in recent years the United States Su-
preme Court has appeared much less eager to strike down the ap-
plication of such a formula on that basis, as it seemingly was in
Hans Rees' Sons."'
For example, in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia,39
GM submitted that an apportionment formula comprising only a
sales-factor, which had been adopted by regulation, not only lack-
ed statutory authority but was also violative of the interstate com-
merce and due process clauses.14 0 Therein, the District of Colum-
bia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947141 imposed a five
percent tax on the net income of any corporation operating within
135. Id. John Deere cited figures for 1937 as follows: San Francisco ratio for wages and
salaries was $6.76/$100 of sales, compared to $4.46/$100 for. all locations. Investment in net
tangible assets in San Francisco was established at $18.26/$100 of sales, compared to $6.76/
$100 for all locations, etc. Id.
136. 38 Cal. 2d at 223, 238 P.2d at 574. During an analysis of this case, one scholar has
commented:
Along the way, it [the California Supreme Court] made a classic statement on relative
productivity and unitary theory. Since what goes on in California can be presumed to
have an effect on the business of an entity nationwide, it is not necessary that any
activity reflected in a formula be equally productive in all states. Higher costs in
California may lead to reduced costs elsewhere and hence greater national profits.
For example, increased sales costs may lead to higher production, lower per unit man-
ufacturing costs, and greater total profit. Though the opinion is directed against sepa-
rate accounting, the court's language leaves no doubt that the FTB [Franchise Tax
Board] need not adjust the formula itself.
Boren, Equitable Apportionment: Administrative Discretion and Uniformity in the Divi-
sion of Corporate Income for State Tax Purposes, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 991, 1015 (1976) (em-
phasis added).
137. 38 Cal. 2d at 224, 238 P.2d at 574.
138. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
139. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
140. Id. at 555.
141. Id at 554.
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the District.142 The Act also provided that in the event a business
was carried on within and without the District, it would be pre-
sumed that the business' income was derived from both within and
without the District.143 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart
hinted that this kind of formula could very well be unconstitu-
tional, but deemed it unnecessary to consider the constitutional
question since the regulation was held to exceed statutory author-
ity.1 44 He stated that a sales-factor formula would apportion 100%
of the net income for an interstate business to a single jurisdiction
when all of the sales were made therein. This would occur regard-
less of the fact that the manufacturing plant may be entirely lo-
cated within another jurisdiction.1
45
Based on this decision, it was not surprising that someone would
subsequently challenge the Iowa single-factor sales formula on con-
stitutional grounds.' 4 In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,1
47
the issue was whether or not the single-factor sales formula used
by the State of Iowa to apportion income of an interstate business,
was violative of the due process and commerce clauses of the fed-
eral constitution.14  Although Moorman Manufacturing Co. did
142. Id.
143. Id. at 554-55.
144. Id. at 556. The regulation was found to allocate income to the District of Colum-
bia in disregard of the provision of the Act governing interstate businesses. Id. Justice Stew-
art pointed out that this type of apportionment formula was at serious variance with the
formulas used by the majority of other states, thereby creating "substantial dangers of mul-
tiple taxation." Id. at 557.
145. Id. at 557-58. The Court noted that states where the property and payroll might
be located, which use the standard three-factor formula, would simultaneously allocate 67%
of the corporation's income to themselves. Id. at 559-60. However, the majority also stated
that it took no position on the constitutionality of a single sales-factor state income tax
formula. Id. at 561. That statement seems contradictory in light of its comments earlier in
the opinion. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. This disclaimer became of para-
mount importance when the Court subsequently sustained the constitutionality of a similar
formula in Moorman. See infra notes 146-159 and accompanying text.
146. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). At the time Moorman was
decided by the United States Supreme Court, 44 of the 45 states imposing a corporate state
income tax used a three-factor formula comprising property, payroll, and sales. Id. at 283-84
(Powell, J., dissenting). Iowa, the 45th state, was the only one continuing to employ a single-
factor formula, the validity of which was sustained in Moorman. Id. at 296 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
It is also interesting to note that eight years after General Motors v. District of Columbia,
380 U.S. 553 (1965), was decided, GM challenged the constitutionality of a two-factor
formula (property and sales) taking it up before the Colorado Supreme Court. See General
Motors Corp. v. State, 181 Colo. 360, 509 P.2d 1260 (1973). That court concluded such a
formula was valid, and that it did not tax extraterritorial values as claimed by GM. Id.
147. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
148. Id. at 269, 271, 276.
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business in many states, the feed products it sold in Iowa were
solely produced in Illinois, with Iowa sales accounting for about
twenty percent of the total." 9
Moorman's due process arguments were rejected by the majority,
largely on the premise that the record was devoid of any separate
accounting analysis that might have shown Iowa taxing income not
fairly attributable to activities conducted within its borders.150 The
distinct implication was that if such an analysis had been made
and the results were supportive of the taxpayer, the single-factor
formula might have been found to infringe upon due process.151
Furthermore, Justice Stevens distinguished General Motors Corp.
v. District of Columbia upon which Moorman had placed substan-
tial reliance, stating that the statutory requirement was unique to
the District of Columbia, while also pointing out in that case that
the Court had expressly declined to rule on the constitutionality of
a single-factor sales formula.52 The majority concluded that the
Iowa statute could be invalidated only if the commerce clause were
construed to prohibit any overlap of taxation by the states.
15 3
In his analysis, Justice Stevens acknowledged that no two states
have identical income tax laws, and that each of the forty-four
other states applied the three-factor formula somewhat differ-
ently.1 54 Consequently, if duplicative taxation were held to violate
the commerce clause in Moorman, the Court would be forced to
prescribe uniform guidelines for all of the states including those
using the generally accepted three-factor formula.155 Since this was
considered to be essentially a legislative task within the scope of
the power granted to Congress, the single-factor sales formula in
Moorman was held to be constitutional.1 56
149. Id. at 269. Moorman Manufacturing Company had over 500 salesmen and six
warehouses in Iowa for the servicing of customers in that state. Id.
150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. Therefore, Justice Stevens termed as "speculative" the taxpayer's claim that
Illinois operations were responsible for a portion of the profits associated witA Iowa sales.
Id. He stated that a separate accounting analysis might even have shown that Illinois opera-
tions prevented Iowa sales from being as profitable as they may have been otherwise. Id.
152. Id. at 274-75. See supra note 145.
153. Id. at 278.
154. Id. at 278-79. E.g., what comprises apportionable business income, when a sale
takes place, what is comprehended in the property, payroll, and sales factors, etc.
155. Id. at 279.
156. Id. at 280-81. The Court viewed the Iowa tax at issue as nothing more than a 1%
gross receipts tax, similar to that levied by the State of Washington which had been upheld
in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Revenue Dep't, 419 U.S. 560 (1975). 437 U.S.
at 280-81.
In a dissent, Justice Powell submitted that the Iowa statute violated the interstate com-
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After Moorman, it was apparent that duplicative taxation, at
least to some extent, was permissible and would withstand com-
merce clause scrutiny. The Court also extended one of its many
invitations to Congress to enact remedial legislation in the event
that it did not agree with the determination in Moorman.157 Addi-
tionally, it appeared from this decision that infringement of due
process by a state's efforts to tax an interstate business' extraterri-
torial income, could still be established by a separate accounting
analysis. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions by the Court have
made it clear that when dealing with a unitary business, the results
of a separate accounting analysis are practically irrelevant. 158
These cases have illustrated that the key to excluding income from
apportionment is to prove that such income has been derived from
sources other than the unitary business.5
9
merce clause. Id. at 297 (Powell, J., dissenting). It was noted that the Court has consistently
held that when one state's practice is significantly out of step with all of the other states'
rules, it must be struck down unless a legitimate local interest outweighs the harm such
practice causes to interstate commerce. Id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
cited Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (the Court found unconstitu-
tional an Illinois law banning mudguards on trucks operating in that state; such mudguards
were required in Arkansas and permitted in forty-five other states), 437 U.S. at 294 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by Justice Blackmun.
157. 437 U.S. at 280.
158. See, e.g., Exxon, 447 U.S. at 221. Therein, the taxpayer proffered separate ac-
counting evidence, contending that Moorman sanctioned such proof. This showing was re-
jected by the Court, which stated that "the taxpayer's accounting evidence was insuffi-
cient .. " Id. at 222. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 72 and infra note 197, and accompanying text. This is not to say
that distortion cannot still be proven in respect to a unitary business. See, e.g., Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968). In this case, the taxpayer, N & W, leased
the Missouri property of the Wabash Railroad, and became obligated to pay the 1965 ad
valorem (property) taxes thereon. N & W's coal-related operations required a great deal of
specialized equipment, virtually none -of which was used in Missouri. Additionally, traffic
density on Missouri tracks was only about 54% of the traffic density of the N & W system
as a whole.
To assess tax, Missouri used a statute which apportioned to that State a part of the total
value of the railway, in the proportion that the mileage of track located in Missouri bore to
the system track mileage as a whole located everywhere. The Missouri Tax Commission
consequently calculated the assessed property value of N & W's rolling stock at $19,981,757.
(The fixed property assessment of $12,177,597 within Missouri was not challenged.)
N & W contested this assessment, offering proof that the value of its rolling stock in
Missouri never ranged far above $7,600,000. In the preceding year, it was brought up that
the rolling stock assessment against Wabash was only $9,177,683. The United States Su-
preme Court sustained the taxpayer, while reversing the Missouri Supreme Court. The lat-
ter had relied on the so-called theory of "enhancement," which Justice Fortas, writing for
the majority, determined was erroneous. The Court found the assessment violative of the
due process and interstate commerce clauses. Id. at 322, 329-30.
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C. Adjustments to the Standard Formula
Taxpayers will frequently petition for adjustment to the stan-
dard three-factor formula, on the grounds that its effects are not
fairly representative of income-producing activity within the state.
This is permitted under Section 18 of UDITPA and most of its
predecessor statutes. 160 Often at issue is what exactly constitutes a
particular factor, e.g., what property is to be included in the prop-
erty factor, and how is it to be valued?161
160. Section 18 of UDITPA states:
If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this Act do not fairly represent the
extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for
or the [tax administrator] may require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's
business activity, if reasonable:
(a) separate accounting;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent
the taxpayer's business activity in this state; or
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation
and apportionment of the taxpayer's income.
See State Tax News - New Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States Approved, 35
TAxEs at 633 (August, 1957). See also Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1958), in which the Court expressly sanctioned the state taxation of net income generated
purely from an interstate business, so long as the net income was apportioned by using "in-
state aspects of interstate affairs." Id. at 460.
161. For an informative review of equitable apportionment, see Boren, supra note 136.
It should be noted that many of these sort of problems pre-dated enactment of UDITPA,
which recognized the existing ambiguities and did much in the way of clarification. See, e.g.,
Sections 10-17 of UDITPA, which purport to define the composition of property, payroll,
and sales factors. These provisions, in their unadulterated version, are as follows:
SECTION 10. The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the aver-
age value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and
used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the average
value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and
used during the tax period.
SECTION 11. Property owned by the taxpayer is valued at its original cost. Property
rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the net annual rental rate. Net annual
rate is the annual rental rate paid by the taxpayer less any annual rental rate re-
ceived by the taxpayer from sub-rentals.
SECTION 12. The average value of property shall be determined by averaging the
values at the beginning and the ending of the tax period but the [tax administrator]
may require the averaging of monthly values during the tax period if reasonably re-
quired to reflect properly the average value of the taxpayer's property.
SECTION 13. The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for compensation,
and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the
tax period.
SECTION 14. Compensation is paid in this state if:
(a) the individual's service is performed entirely within the state; or
(b) the individual's service is performed both within and without the state,
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individ-
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The property factor has probably been subject to the most con-
tention. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Franchise Board162 the
California Supreme Court, in 1968, was confronted with the issue
of whether or not government-owned property used by a taxpayer
to generate income should be included in the property factor. 6 '
During World War II, McDonnell Douglas Corporation had used
such property, in the construction of aircraft for the United States
government. Virtually all of the government-owned property was
located outside of California, while McDonnell Douglas itself
owned substantial property within that state.' 4 Thus, if govern-
ment property were included in the property factor (it would be in
the denominator, thereby reducing the fraction), the taxpayer
would be entitled to a refund of one million dollars for the years
ual's service within the state; or
(c) some of the service is performed in the state and (1) the base of opera-
tions or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service
is directed or controlled is in the state, or (2) the base of operations or the
place from which the service is directed or controlled is not in any state in
which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's residence
is in this state.
SECTION 15. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales
of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is
the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.
SECTION 16. Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if:
(a) the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United
States government, within this state regardless of the F.O.B. point or
other conditions of the sale; or
(b) the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other
place of storage in this state and (1) the purchaser is the United States
government or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the
purchaser.
SECTION 17. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this state
if:
(a) the income-producing activity is performed in this state; or'
(b) the income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this state
and a greater proportion of the income-producing activity is performed in
this state than in any other state, based on costs of performance.
See State Tax News - New Uniform Act for Dividing Income Between States Approved, 35
TAXEs at 632-33 (August, 1957).
Litigation relating to pre-UDITPA statutes but concluded post-UDITPA, has often been
resolved by reliance on UDITPA definitions. See, e.g., Chase Brass & Copper Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 70 Cal. App. 3d 457, 138 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434
U.S. 1029, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 910 (1978).
162. 69 Cal. 2d 506, 446 P.2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1968).
163. Id. at 509, 446 P.2d at 314, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
164. Id. at 510, 446 P.2d at 315, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 467. The property allocated to Cali-
fornia by the taxpayer, as compared with that allocated by the Franchise Tax Board, is as
follows.
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19421945.'165
The California Supreme Court emphasized the statutory direc-
tive that the tax was to be levied upon income "derived from or
attributable to sources within this State." '166 It concluded that the
use of the plants, regardless of who owned them, was essential to
production of the income.16 7 On that basis, the judgment was re-
versed and the case remanded to the superior court for further
proceedings.'"
Several years after McDonnell Douglas came Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Franchise Tax Board.169 The taxpayer contended that
property "in-transit" to the State of California should be included
in the denominator of the property factor but not the numerator,
when apportioning California income.17 0 The court rejected Mont-
gomery Ward's position, stating that it had failed to prove that




The problem of property valuation was much more esoteric in
United States Steel Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board. 72 The trial
Taxpayer's FTB's







165. Id. at 509, 446 P.2d at 314, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
166. Id. at 513, 466 P.2d at 317, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 469. The California Supreme Court
also deemed as significant the fact that the taxpayer had no option under wartime exigen-
cies as to whether or not it could own the property. Id.
167. Id. The court dismissed the Franchise Tax Board's "invested capital" theory, on
the ground that ownership or lack thereof in the instant case had no bearing on the produc-
tion of income. Id.
168. Id. at 515, 446 P.2d at 318, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
169. 6 Cal. App. 3d 149, 85 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 913
(1970).
170. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 154, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
171. Id. at 159, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 898. See also Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 70 Cal. App. 3d 457, 138 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1977). Chase argued that the Board erred
in using original cost rather than fair market value for its mining properties. "Value" had
not been defined in the pre-UDITPA California statutes which governed the controversy.
However, the court ruled that cost valuation was a "logical and reasonable" approach. The.
difficulty in ascertaining a market value was noted, particularly regarding mining properties
which were seldom exchanged through buying and selling. Id. at 471-72, 138 Cal Rptr. at
911.
172. No. 199796, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1982).
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court there initially held that United States Steel- Corporation
(USS) and the four subsidiaries at issue were non-unitary. 73 Nev-
ertheless, the court went on to say that the failure of the State of
California to properly adjust the property factor when combining
the subsidiaries with their parent was "intrinsically arbitrary" and
produced a "gross distortion of income in favor of the State of
California.
1 74
Orinoco Mining Company (Orinoco), a Delaware corporation,
and Quebec Cartier Mining Company (QCM), a Canadian corpora-
tion, produced iron ore in Venezuela and Quebec, Canada, respec-
tively. The ore reserves of these two subsidiaries represented major
income producing assets of the companies. However, the Franchise
Tax Board assigned them a value of zero when computing the
property factor for USS on a combined basis, because the reserves
represented only "concessionary interests" and were not owned
outright.17 5 In his decision, Judge Lucas cited a consequent distor-
tive effect, similar to that in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Board.176 The judge further noted four methods for
valuing the reserves that would have proven suitable substitutes
for an "original cost" valuation. 7 7 It therefore seems that ques-
173. Id. at 5. In its finding of non-unitary, the court relied on most of the cases cited
earlier in this comment, but also placed significant reliance on Woolworth and ASARCO.
These cases had just been handed down by the United States Supreme Court several
months before the decision in United States Steel Corp.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 10. The court stated that ore reserves were real property under the laws of
Canada and Venezuela, and that it was not the "right to extract" but the ore reserves them-
selves, which were to be taken into consideration for the property factor (citing McDonnell
Douglas). Id. at 13. Furthermore, a concessionary interest under Canadian law was substan-
tially the same as outright ownershipI of the reserves, and could only be retaken by the
Canadian government through expropriation, or by default of the concessionaire in its fail-
ure to "work" the claim. Id. at 15. A Venezuelan concession was similar insofar as the con-
cessionaire had to work the concession, or lose it in default to the government. Id.
176. Id. at 12. He also cited Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 70 Cal.
App. 3d 457, 138 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1977). See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
177. No. 199796, slip op. at 16. The price of the ore to be used was suggested as being
the Lower Lake Erie price for Mesabi non-Bessemer iron ore, which was determined by
independent producers in the Minnesota "Iron Range." Id.
These substitutes were: (1) Royalty Method - 6.8% of the published price (which approxi-
mates the royalty a seller of mining concessions could usually obtain) of iron ore multiplied
by the proven concentrated reserves (e.g., for QCM, about 868,980,000 tons) Id. at 17. (2)
Sum of the Taxes Method - average payment of tax per ton made to the foreign government
multiplied by the average net year-end proven reserves (e.g., for Orinoco, about $2.20 per
ton times 641,435,566 tons). Average net year-end reserves were defined to include proven
reserves added during the year, less actual tons produced. Id. (3) Average Cost Method -
average cost per ton multiplied by proven reserves "on-line" (e.g., for QCM, about $2.02 per
ton times 2,069,000,000 tons, and for Orinoco, about $3.52 per ton times 857,797,977 tons).
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tions of unitary and distortion must be resolved at the audit level
whenever possible, precluding the formalization of these issues for
subsequent determination by an administrative or judicial
tribunal.
III. Container Corporation of America
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board178
Proven reserves "on-line" were defined as "proven reserves once committed to the process
of exploitation, without deduction' for actual production." Id. (4) Average Net Profit
Method - average net profit per ton multiplied by proven reserves "on-line" (e.g., for QCM,
about $8.59 per ton times 2,069,000,000 tons, and for Orinoco, about $4.31 per ton times
857,797,977 tons). Id. at 12, 13.
Another fascinating problem regarding property valuation in United States Steel Corp.
concerned the "time charters" for ships used by Navios Corporation and Navigen Company
subsidiaries. Id. at 12, 13. (The time charters were essentially nothing more than long-term
leases with a purchase option. Id.) Both companies were Liberian corporations based in the
Bahamas, engaging in maritime bulk shipping operations. Id. at 5. The state assigned a
value of zero to these charters. However, the trial court indicated that this was inappropri-
ate, suggesting that a substitute for original cost be used, such as "vessel recovery cost."
This method entails the taking of 50% of "vessel operations expense" and multiplying it by
a factor of eight. Id. at 18. Although not actually applied to the facts of the case, the pro-
posed alternative valuations in United States Steel Corp. could be of use to taxpayers in
the future when confronting an absence of "original cost."
See also Kenecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632
(1972), wherein the taxpayer contended that the Tax Commission was required to exclude
from the numerator of the sales factor, sales of products shipped outside of the State of
Utah. A literal reading of the Utah statute seemed to support this position, but the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the Commission's authority to adjust the factors to "fairly represent
the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state [Utah]," relying on Utah's statu-
tory counterpart to Section 18 of UDITPA. Id. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See also Lukenbach Steamship Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 219 Cal. App. 2d 710, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 544 (1963). The taxpayer was a steamship company engaged in interstate commerce.
Because much of its time was spent on the high seas, the Franchise Tax Board adjusted the
three-factor formula by preliminarily multiplying the vessel's value, payroll, and revenue by
a "port-day" formula. This comprised a fraction of number of days in California ports di-
vided by number of days in all ports (e.g. 10/40 = 25%). Luckenbach urged use of a "voy-
age-day" formula, which would replace the denominator by one including all days in and out
of California, including those on the high seas (e.g. 10/100 = 10%). The California Court of
Appeals sustained the "port-day" formula as reasonably reflecting contribution of instate
activities to total income. Id. at 549-50.
See also Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 130 Cal. App. 3d 15, 181 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1982). The taxpayer in Anaconda asserted that adjustments should be made for the income
taxes it paid to the governments of Chile and Mexico. The appellate court rejected this
notion, indicating that Anaconda failed to establish that application of the formula had
yielded a distorted result. Id. at 32, 181 Cal Rptr. at 651.
178. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).Worldwide combined reporting combines the incomes of all
businesses in a unitary relationship, including that income which has not yet been remitted
by the subsidiaries to the parent, e.g., dividends. Naturally, the property, payroll and sales
of these subsidiaries are comprehended in the denominator of the apportionment formula.
See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2945 n.11.
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decided one year after ASARCO and Woolworth, was the first case
in which the United States Supreme Court would address the va-
lidity of worldwide combined reporting. Mobil, ASARCO, and
Woolworth were concerned only with dividends and other intangi-
ble income remitted by foreign and domestic subsidiaries to their
parent companies. Exxon did involve combined reporting, but in a
domestic context.
The taxpayer in Container raised three major issues: (1)
Whether or not Container Corporation conducted a unitary busi-
ness with its overseas subsidiaries? (2) If so, did California's using
a three-factor apportionment formula in a worldwide context vio-
late the due process and commerce clauses? (3) Regardless, was
California required under the foreign commerce clause to employ
the "arms-length" analysis in ascertaining taxable income, instead
of formulary apportionment?"'9 At first blush the Container Court
appears, perhaps, to obfuscate the clarity with which unitary had
earlier been expounded by ASARCO and Woolworth. But, the de-
cision actually does nothing more than further refine the principles
articulated in ASARCO and Woolworth.
A. Implications for Defining Unitary
The Court initially considered whether or not a unitary relation-
ship existed between Container Corporation and its twenty foreign
subsidiaries, and found that it did. The latter, like Container itself,
were fully integrated manufacturers of paperboard products.""o
Container's ownership of these subsidiaries, either directly or
through other subsidiaries, ranged between 66.7% and 100%.'1
Thus, in light of these facts Container Corporation already had
two significant factors against it based on ASARCO and
See supra notes 54-105 and accompanying text. Mobil was the only case prior to
Container, wherein foreign subsidiaries were held to be in a unitary relationship with the
parent company. However, Mobil dealt only with apportionment of dividends remitted to
the parent company and not the subsidiaries' entire incomes. 445 U.S. at 433. The Mobil
Court indicated that the issue of what constituted a fair apportionment formula was not
presented and therefore would not be reviewed. Id. at 449. Vermont had completely ex-
cluded the subsidiaries' payroll, sales, and property values from the formula (which would
have increased the denominator, thereby decreasing Vermont's share of the income), while
nevertheless apportioning the income associated therewith. Id.at 460-61. See also 103 S. Ct.
at 2942 n.5. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
179. 103 S. Ct. at 2939.
180. Id. at 2943. The subsidiaries were located in four Latin American and four Euro-
pean countries. Id.
181. Id. In the instances where less than 100% was owned by Container, the balance
was owned by local nationals. Id.
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1984 Corporations: State Income Taxation 969
Woolworth. First, it owned a controlling interest in each of the
subsidiaries. Although the potential to control may not be disposi-
tive, it is requisite to a finding of unitary. 18 2 Secondly, as the Court
had previously noted in Woolworth, multinational manufacturing
companies are much more susceptible to "substantial mutual inter-
dependence" than are certain other businesses such as retail
merchandising 83l
The majority opinion noted that several other factors were also
significant as grounds for sustaining the California Court of Ap-
peals' finding of unitary. Justice Brennan observed that the parent
had provided substantial loans and loan guarantees to the subsidi-
aries as part of a conscious effort to nurture them.18 4 Additionally,
the managerial role played by Container Corporation in the affairs
of its subsidiaries, was deemed much more than the "occasional
oversight . .. any parent gives to an investment in a subsidi-
ary."1 5 Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the state court
had properly acted within its discretion when it endorsed the ad-
ministrative presumption that related corporations in the same
line of business are unitary.
1 86
182. See 103 S. Ct. at 2946 n.15, where it is stated that "a unitary business finding [in
ASARCO] was impermissible because the partial subsidiaries were not realistically subject
to even minimal control by ASARCO, and were therefore passive investments in the most
basic sense of the term." Id.
183. See 458 U.S. at 371, and see supra note 101 and accompanying text. Neither
ASARCO nor Woolworth had both of these elements present.
184. 103 S. Ct. at 2944, 2948 n.19. About 50% of the subsidiaries' long-term debt was
either held directly or guaranteed by Container Corporation. Id. at 2944. Contrast this with
the factual situation in Woolworth, wherein the Court noted that "each subsidiary was re-
sponsible for obtaining its own financing from sources other than the parent." See 458 U.S.
at 356.
185. 103 S. Ct. at 2943, 2947, and 2948 n.19. It was pointed out that even though day
to day decisions were made by local management, the parent had one senior vice-president
and four other officers responsible for policy, resolving major problems, and making long-
term decisions. Id. at 2944. Container also provided a number of services to the subsidiaries,
including technical assistance. Id. Thus, the subsidiaries had ready access to the parent's
expertise. They were only charged for these services at cost and an apportionment of over-
head; sometimes the charges were never even passed on. See Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 998-99. Sales of services were
also made by the parent to a subsidiary in ASARCO, but at arms-length negotiated fees as
set forth in a formalized agreement. See 458 U.S. at 321 n.17.
186. 103 S. Ct. at 2947. Justice Brennan observed that:
When a corporation invests in a subsidiary that engages in the same line of work as
itself, it becomes much more likely that one function of the investment is to make
better use = either through economies of scale or through operational integration or
sharing of expertise - of the parent's existing business-related resources.
Id. It is particularly interesting that in ASARCO, Justice O'Connor, dissenting from a find-
ing of nonunitary, cited such a presumption as one of the bases for her position. See 458
Duquesne Law Review
Even though it may be interesting to compare the factual cir-
cumstances of Container with those of prior cases, facts will usu-
ally not be critical during appellate review. Justice Brennan stated
in Container that the Court's task was "to determine whether the
state court applied the correct [legal] standards to the case; and if
it did, whether its judgment 'was within the realm of permissible
judgment.' "s187 He noted that ASARCO and Woolworth were con-
sistent with this principle.188 The trial courts in both of these cases
had made a finding of nonunitary, which was reversed by the re-
spective state supreme courts, but reinstated by the United States
Supreme Court.18 9 Similarly, in Container the lower courts both
held unitary.1 90 It is therefore apparent that success at the trial
court level is extremely important.
However, any taxpayer litigating an issue of unitary should be
careful not to stipulate the facts. The facts were stipulated in
Container, which caused the California Court of Appeals to ob-
serve that the case presented no conflicting evidence."' That ap-
pellate court noted that "[tlherefore, this court is not constrained
by the substantial evidence rule. The trial court's findings are not
binding on us and we must make our own determination of the
questions of law presented by the stipulated facts."'"s2 Thus, to
limit the scope of appellate review, a taxpayer should always liti-
gate the facts.
B. Distortion
The second question confronted by the Court after a finding of
U.S. at 335-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, contrary to its conclusion now, the Court
in ASARCO dismissed the validity of Justice O'Connor's assertion by referring to the trial
court's finding that ASARCO's "stock investments were not integral nor a necessary part of
[ASARCO's] business operation . . ." Id. at 324 n.21.
The taxpayer also urged that a "bright-line" rule be adopted, which would require a "sub-
stantial flow of goods" for a finding of unitary to be sustained. 103 S. Ct. at 2947. Only
about 1% of the subsidiaries' purchases were made from the parent. Id. at 2943. Regardless,
the Court refused to consider the flow of goods to be determinative, indicating that it was a
"flow of value" that was critical in establishing the existence of a unitary business. Id. at
2947.
187. 103 S. Ct. at 2946. Justice Brennan downplayed the importance of facts, stating
that the records in these sort of cases "tend to be long and complex," and that it would not
be good to turn every question on appeal into a "de novo adjudication." Id.
188. Id. at 2946 n.15.
189. 458 U.S. at 314-15, 360.
190. 103 S. Ct. at 2945. The California Supreme Court refused to review the Court of
Appeals' decision. Id.
191. 173 Cal. Rptr. at 124, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 993.
192. Id.
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unitary, was whether or not application of the three-factor formula
in a worldwide context was distortive beyond constitutionally per-
missible dimensions.193 Container Corporation asserted that lower
wage rates in the foreign countries wherein the subsidiaries oper-
ated, which purportedly were not offset by lower productivity
levels, skewed the results of formulary apportionment in favor of
the United States and in particular, California.
19 4
In reviewing the merits of the three-factor formula in Container,
Justice Brennan cited Hans Rees' Sons for the proposition that
application of a formula with an outrageously distortive effect
would still be struck down.'9 5 Distortion in that case was proven by
a "separate accounting analysis skewed to resolve all doubts in
favor of the State." 1"' Still, it is highly unlikely that separate ac-
counting, because of its acknowledged inherently "suspect" nature,
can be used to prove unacceptable distortion.'9 7 A taxpayer seeking
to establish distortion in the future would be wise to adopt an al-
ternative approach, such as that employed in Norfolk & Western
Railway Co. v. Tax Commissioner.99 It is also relevant to note
that in the past, whenever application of a formula has been struck
down, the distortive effects have been substantial.'99 The Court
193. 103 S. Ct. at 2939, 2948. The essence of fair apportionment is that the income
attributed to a state bear a "rational relationship" with the "intra-state values of the enter-
prise." Id. at 2948. Of course, the burden of proof is always upon the taxpayer to establish
the contrary. Id.
194. Id. at 2949. A showing was made that one foreign plant had labor costs that ap-
proximated 40% of similar costs for Container's California plants.
Recent challenges of apportionment factors have dealt primarily with application of a
single-factor formula. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) and General
Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965). See supra notes 139-157 and
accompanying text. The validity of the three-factor formula, at least in a domestic context,
had been sustained at least several times some years earlier by the California courts. See
supra notes 122-137 and accompanying text.
195. 103 S. Ct. at 2949. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. The Hans
Rees' Sons Court had addressed the validity of a single-factor property formula. Id. See 283
U.S. 123 and supra notes 113-138.
196. 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
197. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2940, where Justice Brennan observed that "formal ac-
counting is subject to manipulation and imprecision, and often ignores or captures inade-
quately the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place upon
the components of a single enterprise." Id. See also supra note 158 and accompanying text.
198. 390 U.S. 317. See supra note 159.
199. See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons, where the formula distorted the taxpayer's income by
250%. The alleged distortion in Container however, was only 14%. 103 S. Ct. at 2950. Jus-
tice Brennan compared the taxpayer's calculation of net income using the three-factor
formula (excluding the subsidiaries' factors and income) to the state's calculations (which
included the subsidiaries' factors and income). A summary of the tax implications is shown
below-
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failed to conclude that constitutionally impermissible distortion
had occurred in Container, apparently based on: (1) the Court's
recent reluctance to strike down application of a single-factor
formula; (2) the widespread popularity and acceptance of the
three-factor formula; (3) the Court's skepticism regarding the accu-
racy and merits of separate accounting for a unitary business; and
(4) the degree of distortion being alleged.
C. The Foreign Commerce Clause
The final issue in Container was whether or not California was
obligated, under the foreign commerce clause, to use a separate ac-
counting (arms-length) analysis in place of formulary apportion-
ment.2 00 This method of calculating income is used by the federal
government and most foreign nations.01 Citing Japan Line Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, Justice Brennan indicated that because
foreign subsidiaries were involved, two additional factors had to be
evaluated beyond those normally present in strictly a domestic set-
ting:202 (1) whether this was a fairly-apportioned state tax that
subjected foreign commerce to multiple taxation to which domestic
commerce was not exposed; (2) if there was the possibility that the
"state tax will 'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential.' "2S
Tax at 5.5% 1963 1964 1965 Total
Per Taxpayer $163,172 $168,422 $174,590 $506,184
Per State 178,477 202,311 197,341 578,129
Differences $15,305 $33,889 $22,751 $71,945
Id. at 2945.
Of course, like many other tax cases, subsequent intervening years will be affected by any
conclusive determinations.
200. 103 S. Ct. at 2939. See supra note 199. The Constitution provides that "Congress
shall have Power. . .[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
201. 103 S. Ct. at 2952. It was acknowledged that the federal government has indi-
cated a preference for the arms-length separate accounting method. Id. at 2952. However,
the Court also concluded that there was no basis for federal pre-emption of California's
usage of worldwide formulary apportionment. Id. at 2956-57.
202. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). This case involved an attempt by California to levy a fairly
apportioned, nondiscriminatory, property tax on cargo containers used in foreign commerce
which were temporarily located in California ports. The containers were also subjected to an
unapportioned property tax in their home port of Japan. The Court held that the California
tax was invalid because of its failure to pass constitutional muster under the foreign com-
merce clause. 103 S. Ct. at 2951. See also infra notes 203, 215, and accompanying text.
203. 103 S. Ct. at 2951 (quoting from Japan Line). The interstate commerce clause
governs domestically, but the foreign commerce clause comes into play when foreign com-
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The multiple taxation in Container allegedly occurred because
California apportions the income earned by foreign subsidiaries,
while the foreign countries in which the subsidiaries are located
levy an unapportioned income tax on income determined by the
arms-length method.210 Container Corporation's assertion of multi-
ple taxation was especially appealing in light of the Court's ration-
ale in Japan Line for striking down the unapportioned property
tax. The majority therein had noted that unlike within the United
States "the absence of an [international] authoritative tribunal ca-
pable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes is no more than one
full value" does not exist.2 0 5 Therefore, it seemed that one could
logically deduce that, because California was so far out of step with
the rest of the world, impermissible multiple taxation would be
found in Container. However, Justice Brennan distinguished Ja-
pan Line, noting that it concerned a tax on property rather than
income,0 6 with the incidence of tax falling on a domestic corpora-
tion,0 7 not an instrumentality of foreign commerce. Furthermore,
in the instant case double taxation was not the inevitable result of
formulary apportionment, unlike the property tax in Japan
Line.06 It was suggested that California could avoid double taxa-
tion by foregoing any tax on the taxpayer's income, which was not
a fair alternative.0 9 Justice Brennan failed to mention that per-
haps California should limit its taxation to a domestic unitary bus-
iness, which is the basis on which Container Corporation had origi-
nally calculated its tax liability.21 0 Another alternative noted was
for the state to adopt the arms-length method, but that would not
necessarily preclude double taxation either, according to the
majority.
211
The Court then went on to address the other leg of the argument
merce is involved. Id. at 2950-51.
204. Id. at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2951. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
206. 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
207. Id. See also id. at n.26, in which the Court expressly declined to rule on the
constitutionality of domestic corporations with foreign parents, or foreign operations with
either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries. Id.
208. Id. at 2952.
209. Id. at 2953.
210. Id. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
211. 103 S. Ct. at 2953. Justice Powell further discussed this matter in his dissent,
observing that: "Under the former [formulary apportionment], double taxation is inevitable.
It cannot be avoided without changing the system itself. Under the latter [arms-length], any
double taxation that exists is the result of disagreements in application." Id. at 2959 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting).
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under Japan Line, as to whether impairment of federal uniformity
occurred. It essentially reiterated the reasons given for rejecting
the assertions of multiple taxation.2" Additionally, the majority in-
dicated foreign policy was much more the province of the Execu-
tive Branch and the Congress, than that of the Supreme Court. On
that basis, and after a review of the relative inaction by Congress
on the matter, it was concluded that foreign policy was not impli-
cated." s  Nonetheless, Justice Brennan made it clear that
Container did not concern the propriety of a tax whose incidence
would fall upon a foreign parent and a domestic subsidiary.1
Although the arguments raised pursuant to Japan Line had sig-
nificant merit, their rejection was highly predictable. In both Ex-
xon and Mobil, Japan Line had been distinguished as applying to
a property tax, and the narrowly articulated holding therein was
consistent with this construction. 15 There was no reason to believe
that in Container, this position would be reversed.1
IV. CONCLUSION
The Container decision is a clear indication that broad discre-
212. Id. at 2955-56. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
213. 103 S. Ct. at 2956-57.
214. Id. at 2956 n.32. Justice Powell suggested that levying the tax against a foreign
parent could invite international disputes or retaliation against American corporations. Id.
at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting). But failing to do so results in discrimination against domes-
tic parents. Id.
215. Id. at 2952 n.24. The issue in Japan Lines was "whether instrumentalities of
commerce that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in
international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a
State." Id. See 441 U.S. at 444. The Court held that the tax resulted in the impermissible
multiple taxation of the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, in addition to preventing
"the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice' in international trade." Id. at 453.
216. Justice Powell wrote a persuasive dissent in which he was joined by The Chief
Justice and Justice O'Connor. 103 S. Ct. at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
took no part in deciding the case.
The dissent intimated that constitutionally impermissible double taxation occurred be-
cause "California has rejected accepted international practice in favor of a tax structure that
is fundamentally different in its basic assumptions." Id. at 2959 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell contended that while the majority discussed the exacting scrutiny required
under Japan Line, they failed to apply it. Id. at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also 441
U.S. at 451. He suggested that California could simply apply its apportionment formula to
Container Corporation's income, as reported on its federal tax return. 103 S. Ct. at 2957 n.1
(Powell, J., dissenting). He noted that double taxation would be avoided to the extent that
the federal government had negotiated with the foreign government. Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
Justice O'Connor's siding with the taxpayer in Container was unexpected, since she had
authored the dissents in ASARCO and Woolworth. 458 U.S. at 331, 373 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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tion will be afforded state tax administrators in the future. It has
become apparent that so long as state courts adjudicate related
disputes within proper legal standards, their decisions are not
likely to be disturbed upon appellate review. Thus, it becomes crit-
ical that the taxpayer win at the trial court level any contested
matter of state taxation.
Since a determination of the scope of a unitary business is essen-
tially a factual question, insofar as the trial court articulates the
correct legal standards as a basis for its decision it will probably
not be reversed. To further limit the scope of appellate review, a
taxpayer should never agree to stipulate the facts. With no con-
tested issues of fact, any issue raised on appeal by implication is of
a legal nature. Therefore, the appellate court will not be con-
strained by the substantial evidence rule when facts are stipulated.
It has also become obvious in recent years that a sufficient show-
ing of distortion through separate accounting to invalidate a state
tax is virtually impossible. The only way to exclude income from
apportionment and consequent taxation, is to establish that it is
not derived from the unitary business. In light of this, the neces-
sary factual predicate becomes even more important.
It will be interesting to see if Congress can reconcile the diver-
sity of affected interests, to permit development of a more uniform
system of state taxation than currently exists. Whether state
courts can exercise the necessary objectivity to restrain aggressive
state tax administrators in the meantime remains to be seen. Re-
gardless, the Court may be correct in concluding that its hands-off
resolution of the unitary issue is better than band-aid legislation
by judicial fiat.
Garet H. Danvers
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